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Plumb and Lundwall: Wyoming Rules of Evidence 701-706: Opinions and Expert Testimony

WYOMING RULES OF EVIDENCE 701-706:
OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
In April 1977, the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the
Federal Rules of Evidence as the Wyoming Rules of Evidence,
to become effective January 1, 1978. Article VII was adopted
without any substantial changes' and the purpose of this
Comment is to explore the six rules and their probable application in Wyoming courts.
2
RULE 701: OPINION TESTIMONY BY LAY WITNESSES

Rule 701 provides the standard for opinion testimony by
a lay witness. To be admissible, the lay opinion must be "rationally based on the perception of the witness" and it must
be "helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue." The first requirement of
Rule 701 restricts the witness's testimony to matters within
his personal knowledge and observation, hence requiring that
a competent foundation be laid for the testimony.3 The second requirement guards against the admission of superfluous
opinion testimony and is comparable to a relevancy requirement. The Rule imposes a requirement of "helpfulness" which
is less demanding than a standard which admits opinion evidence only when- it is strictly "necessary" 4 for determination
of issues.
The standard applied in prior Wyoming case law was the
orthodox rule that lay witnesses must testify to facts and may
not give opinions.5 This rule was based on the common law
assumption that the testimony as to facts was more reliable
than and readily distinguishable from the testimony as to
Copyright©1978 by the University of Wyoming.

1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

According to a Wyoming Committee Note, Article VII of the Wyoming Rules of
Evidence is identical to Article VII of the Federal Rules except that Wyoming Rule
706(b) omits a provision for payment from public funds in "proceedings involving
just compensation under the fifth amendment." In Wyoming condemnation proceedings, the state is not always the plaintiff and Rule 71.1(1) Wyoming Rules of
Civil Procedure provides for apportionment of costs.
"If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions
or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally
based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of
his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue."
FED. R. Evi). 701, Adv. Comm. Note; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE T, 701 [02], at 701-11 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN].
"[NJ ecessity as a standard for permitting opinions and conclusions has proved too
elusive and too unadaptable to particular situations for purposes of satisfactory judicial administration." FED. R. EVID. 701, Adv. Comm. Note. See also MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE § 11 (2d ed, 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK] ; WEINSTEIN
701 [02], at 701-13. The necessity tests admits opinion testimony only if essential
to the determination of fact.
Long v. Big Horn Constr. Co., 75 Wyo. 276, 295 P.2d 750 (1956); State v. Moore,
3561.2d 141 (Wyo. 1960).
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opinions.6 However, the line of distinction is not nearly so
clear since the witness, despite the words he uses, cannot recreate the actual event, and his statement is still to some degree the product of inference, memory and reflection. 7 As an
eminent author noted, "the difference between the statement,
'He was driving on the left-hand side of the road' which would
be classed as 'fact' under the rule, and 'He was driving carelessly' which would be called 'opinion' is merely a difference
between a more concrete and specific form of descriptive
statement and a less specific and concrete form." 8
In addition to the nebulous boundary line between facts
and opinions, the insistence upon solely factual testimony
has often delayed or obstructed the trial process. Many witnesses use inferences and opinions intermixed with factual
descriptions to clarify their narratives. Hence, when witnesses
are constantly interrupted by objections, their testimony often becomes garbled, they are distracted, and the jury misses
the point of their testimony. 9
In recognition of the unclear distinction between facts
and opinions and the necessity of admitting some opinions to
expedite the trial process, prior Wyoming case law permitted
lay opinion testimony to describe sound, size, weight, distance, speed and numerous other subjects that can only be related factually in language embodying inferences and opinions .10
Rule- 701 goes further than allowing inferences and opinions to be expressed only when they are inextricably intertwined with the underlying observations." The Rule is basically one of discretion which permits judges to admit adequately-founded, helpful opinion testimony when a statement
of the underlying facts would be a waste of time. 12 The Rule
then entrusts the jury to give proper weight to admissible
opinion testimony in relation to strictly factual testimony on
the issues in question.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

MCCORMICK § 11, at 23.
Id.
Id. at 23-24.
701
Central R.R. Co. v. Monahan, 11 F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 1926); WEINSTEIN
[02], at 701-14.
E.g., Colwell v. Anderson, 438 P.2d 448 (Wyo. 1968); Cederburg v. Carter, 448
P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1968).
701 [02], at701-13.
WEINSTEIN
Id. at 701-13 to 14.
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RULE 702: TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS13

Rule 702 allows factual or opinion testimony by a qualified expert if the expert's answer "will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
The requirement of helpfulness in assisting the trier of fact
may be determined by a common-sense inquiry as to whether
the untrained layman would be qualified to determine the issue to the best possible degree without enlightenment from
those having a specialized understanding of the subject mat4

ter.1

There are some cases in which an understanding and determination of the issues necessarily depends upon expert testimony; so as a matter of substantive law, the plaintiff loses
if he does not come forward with expert evidence. 15 The primary example of this type of case is the medical malpractice
suit, 6 except where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable and the medical negligence is sufficiently apparent and
understandable to be within the realm of common knowledge.l1
In other cases the admissibility of expert testimony is less
clear-cut and will be determined with discretion according to
the "helpfulness" standard. The application of this standard
and the proper and improper use of expert testimony was
demonstrated in a recent case. 8 There, a Federal Bureau of
Investigation photographic expert gave an opinion on the
similarity between photographs of the face of the accused
and surveillance photographs taken during a bank robbery.
He gave a second opinion on the similarity between clothing
and a pistol shown in the surveillance photographs and photographs of clothing and a pistol seized from the accused's
apartment. The testimony concerning the comparison of the
two facial photographs was held to be improper because the
13. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
14. FED. R. EviD. 702, Adv. Comm. Note.
702 [011, at 702-7.
15. WEINSTEIN
16. See Comment, Medical Malpractice-Expert Testimony, 60 Nw. L. REV. 834
(1966).
17. E.g., Vonault v. O'Rourke, 97 Mont. 92, 33 P.2d 535 (1934) (burn from hot water
bottle); Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N.C. 178, 13 S.E.2d 242 (1941) (sponge left inside patient). See Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 420 (1952).
18. United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1974).
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jurors' common experience enabled them to make the comparison without the aid of an expert. However, the testimony
concerning the comparisons of the photographs of the pistol
and the clothing were held to be proper because the jurors
could not adequately make the comparison without expert
assistance .19
In another case, 20 an economist was permitted to testify,
in a wrongful death action, on the value of a hypothetical
housewife in the decedent's position had she lived. The receipt
of the testimony was upheld since it was helpful to the jury
21
and more reliable than the jury's musings on her worth.
The helpfulness standard specified in the Rule is comparable to the standard applied in prior Wyoming case law that
expert testimony was inadmissible where the normal experiences and qualifications of lay jurors enabled them to draw
proper conclusions from the given facts. Expert testimony
could be received only where special knowledge would aid
the court or jurors on the subject matter.2 2 As examples of
the previous application of this standard, Wyoming courts
have held that whether a particular teacher's certificate is of
as high or higher rank than another certificate is not a matter
of common knowledge and is a proper matter for expert testimony. 23 So also is the question of damages suffered by a
tractor designed and equipped to haul and control a trailer
24
carrying a heavy load.
Rule 702 is broadly phrased to encompass scientific, technical and all other specialized knowledge. Similarly, the term
''experts" is expansively defined to include those persons
qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." Thus, in addition to physicians, scientists, and other
experts who qualify by academic and professional credentials,
the scope of the Rule encompasses a large group of "skilled"
witnesses, such as bankers or landowners testifying as to land
values.2 5 In one case, a user and a seller of drugs were considered "experienced" and thus qualified to give expert opinions
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 149-50.
Har-Pen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967).
Id. at 711-12.
Long v. Big Horn Constr. Co., supra note 5.
State ex rel. Pape v. Hockett, 61 Wyo. 145, 161-62, 156 P.2d 299, 304 (1945).
Logan v. Pacific Intermountain Exp. Co., 400 P.2d 488, 493 (Wyo. 1965).
FED. R. EVID. 702, Adv. Comm. Note.
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as to whether a certain substance was heroin.26 In another
case, an appellate court, while conceding the trial court had
considerable discretion in deciding whether an expert was
qualified, found it error to exclude the testimony of a pipefitter who had thirty-three years of experience on the ground
that he was not a metallurgist. The appellate court held the
pipefitter's extensive experience qualified him as an expert
27
who could aid the jury.
This aspect of the Rule is in accord with prior Wyoming
case law which held that experts could qualify both by academic credentials or practical experience. As examples of the
application of the "practical experience" formula, Wyoming
courts have permitted a landowner to testify as to land values,2 a dealer in secondhand oil-field equipment to testify as
to the value of oil-field equipment,2 9 and a truck driver and
repairman to testify as to truck damage sustained in a collision .3
Under Rule 702, courts have permitted expert testimony
even where the expert is not absolutely certain or lacks complete knowledge about the field in question, so long as his
testimony is helpful to the jury.3 1 In one case, for example, a
handwriting expert was permitted to testify "although he
could not be sure" the two writings in question were prob32
ably prepared by the same person.
Under Rule 104(a),33 also adopted in Wyoming, questions
concerning the admissibility of evidence are to be decided by
the court. The judge will make the initial determination under
this Rule whether a case is a proper one for expert testimony
and whether the proposed experts are properly qualified. Be26.
27.

United States v. Atkins, 473 F.2d 308, 313 (8th Cir. 1973).
Cunningham v. Gans, 507 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974). See, e.g., Moran v. Ford
Motor Co., 476 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1973) (reversible error to exclude testimony of
automobile repairman with eighteen years experience); Holmgren v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 516 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1975) (reversible error to exclude testimony of
college professor-farmer who was familiar with farm machinery).
28. Town of Douglas v. Nielsen, 409 P.2d 240, 242 (Wyo. 1965).
29. Chittim v. Armco Steel Corp., 407 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Wyo. 1965).
30. Logan v. Pacific Intermountain Exp. Co., supra note 24, at 493.
31. WEINSTEIN
702 [021, at 702-13 to 14.
32. United States v. Spencer, 439 F.2d 1047, 1049 (2d Cir. 1971).
33. "Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is
not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to .privileges." See
LOUISELL & MUELLER, 1 FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 27, 35 (1977); WEINSTEIN
702 [01], at 7024 to 5.
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cause there is no precise formula for determining which cases
require expert testimony or for qualifying experts and because
qualification must necessarily depend upon the particular expertise of each expert witness, the trial judge has considerable
discretion under Rule 104(a) to determine appropriate cases
for expert testimony and qualification of expert witnesses.3
The appellate courts will sustain the admission or exclusion
of expert evidence by the trial court unless such action is
shown to be manifestly erroneous.35 According to one author,
doubts about whether an expert's testimony will be helpful
in a case should generally be resolved in favor of admissibility
unless there are strong factors favoring exclusion such as time
or surprise. 6 Under prior Wyoming case law, determination
of appropriate cases for expert testimony and qualification of
expert witnesses also rested in the broad discretion of the
trial court whose determination was not disturbed except in
extreme cases.37 Thus, this aspect of the Rule presents no significant changes from prior practice.
The concluding phrase of Rule 702 permits an expert to
testify "in the form of an opinion or otherwise." The phrase
is intended to recognize that an expert need not testify only
in the form of opinions. Accordingly, the expert may give a
dissertation or exposition of principles relevant to the case,
leaving the trier of fact to apply the principles to the facts
and draw the necessary conclusions.3
RULE 703: BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS3

Rule 703 contains a striking change from the common
law evidentiary rules. The first sentence of the Rule follows
the common law fairly closely in allowing expert opinion
based on facts or data which are perceived by the expert or
made known to him at or before the hearing. This sentence
702 [011, at 702-10.

34.

WEINSTEIN

35.

E.g., Salem v. United States Lines, 370 U.S. 31 (1962); Fernandez v. Chios Shipping Co., Ltd., 542 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Green, 548 F.2d
1261 (6th Cir. 1977).
WEINSTEIN 1 702 [01], at 702-9.

36.

E.g., Taylor v. MacDonald, 409 P.2d 762 (Wyo. 1966); Colo. Serum Co. v. Arp,
504 P.2d 801 (Wyo. 1972); Elite Cleaners & Tailors, Inc. v. Gentry, 510 P.2d 784
(Wyo. 1973); Runnion v. Kitts, 531 P.2d 1307 (Wyo. 1975).
38. FED. R. EVID. 702, Adv. Comm. Note.
39. "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence."
37.
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authorizes the customary practice of permitting expert opinion testimony based on firsthand knowledge or evidence introduced at the trial phrased in terms of hypothetical questions. 40 Although the Advisory Committee criticized the hypothetical question as encouraging partisan bias, allowing
mid-trial summations, and being time consuming, 41 the evidentiary tool is still available without any express limitation
4
on its use.
The second sentence of the Rule provides a radical departure from the common law by allowing expert opinion testimony based on inadmissible facts and data if they are of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field.
According to the Advisory Committee, the Rule is designed
to broaden the basis for expert opinions and to bring judicial
practice into harmony with the practice of experts when not
in court. 43 As an example, the Advisory Committee noted
that physicians rely on information from relatives and hospital personnel in making diagnoses and "life-and-death" decisions and that such opinions, subject to cross-examination,
44
should suffice for judicial purposes.
Prior Wyoming case law followed the traditional approach
by allowing expert witnesses to testify on the basis of firsthand knowledge and to answer hypothetical questions based
on facts in evidence, 4' but expert opinion testimony based on
inadmissible facts was not permitteds46 Application of Rule
703 will streamline litigation in Wyoming by permitting expert opinion testimony without an expensive and time-consuming prior procession of witnesses to lay a foundation for
the opinion. 47 Hence, expert opinion testimony based on information from third parties will require no greater foundation than expert opinion testimony based on personal observation or facts obtained at trial and will permit expert testimony based upon hearsay.4 8
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

FED. R. EVID. 703, Adv. Comm. Note.
FED. R. EVID. 702, Adv. Comm. Note; FED. R. EVID. 705, Adv. Comm. Note.
Gibbons, Rules 701-706: Opinions and Expert Testimony, TRIAL LAW. GUIDE
500,503 (1976).
FED. R. EVID. 703, Adv. Comm. Note.
Id.
E g., Culver v. Sekulich, 80 Wyo. 437, 344 P.2d 146 (1959); Elite Cleaners & Tailors,
Inc. v. Gentry, 510 P.2d 784 (Wyo. 1973); Ford Motor Co. v. Kuhbacher, 518 P.2d
1255 (Wyo. 1974).
E.g., State v. Alexander, 78 Wyo. 324, 324 P.2d 831 (1958); Lujan v. State, 423
P.2d 388 (Wyo. 1967).
FED. R. EVID. 703, Adv. Comm. Note.
FED. R. EVID. 703 does not authorize an expert witness to repeat the information
received from those reliable sources and therefore is not a hearsay exception.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977

7

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 3, Art. 7

982

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol'XIII

According to the Rule, the "facts or data" upon which an
expert bases an opinion must be of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the same field. Accordingly, admissibility
turns upon a standard of reliability and does not require a
showing of necessity. 9 It is not specifically stated in the language that reasonably reliable "facts or data" include opinions
from third parties. Arguably, third party opinions should be
encompassed within the phrase "facts or data" since such an
interpretation would be in keeping with the liberality of Rule
703. The drafters thought the Rule covered third party opinions 0 and in practice, an expert would be unlikely to make a
distinction between facts and opinions received from a reliable
source."
Also unclear from the Rule's language is whether the expert witness or the judge determines what is reasonably reliable in the field. A plain reading of the language suggests that
the standards and practice in particular fields will be determinative. However, the Advisory Committee's Note hints that
52
reasonableness may be determined by a judicial standard.
According to one author, the trial judge, in his discretion,
will determine under Rule 104(a) whether the facts or data
could be reasonably relied upon.53 Where there is a serious issue, the judge will determine reliability by examining the expert outside the presence of the jury. 54 However, since the
expert will know what is reasonably relied upon in his field,
the judge will usually follow the expert's advice on the point. 55
The degree of confidence the court has in the professional
calibre and ethics of the particular expert group will undoubtedly affect the amount of deference given to the expert's ad56
vice on reasonable reliability.
Admissibility of expert evidence based upon hearsay will
also be affected by the nature of the case. Where a matter is
being tried before a judge, a more lenient standard may be
applied for admitting expert opinion based upon hearsay
703 [02], at 703-14.
49. WEINSTEIN
50. FED. R. EVID. 703, Adv. Comm. Note.
51. McElhaney, Expert Witnesses and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 MERCER L.
REV. 463, 483 (1977).
52. FED. R. EVID. 703, Adv. Comm. Note.
53. WEINSTEIN 9 703 [01], at 703-4.
54. Id. C 703 1031 .at 703-17.
55. Id. Ji 703 [01],at703-5.
56. Id. "Physicians are likely to be given more leeway than accidentologists."
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than if a case is being tried before a jury. 57 As an example of
this double standard, it was held in one case that reversal was
not required in a non-jury case where a patrolman's testimony
was based upon hearsay, although reversal would have been
58
required had the testimony been admitted before a jury.
Also, there may be more stringent requirements for admitting
expert opinions based on hearsay in criminal cases than in
civil suits. In criminal cases, the constitutional right of confrontation may require in certain instances that the defendant
be allowed to cross-examine the persons who prepared the
data on which the expert relies.59
In the area of public opinion polls, a court's application
of the Rule will determine the admissibility of survey evidence
on a sound basis. Historically, public opinion poll evidence
was sometimes excluded or given little weight because the
testifying expert based his opinion on hearsay.60 Under the
Rule, however, admissibility turns upon the reliability and
validity of the techniques employed rather than an inquiry
whether hearsay is involved. 61 In utilizing this approach, once
the validity of the survey is established and the requirements
of Rules 401 and 403 are met, 62 the testimony is admitted
and the trier of fact then determines the weight to be given
6
to the survey evidence. 1
64
RULE 704: OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE

Wyoming Rule of Evidence 704 abolishes the "ultimate
facts" rule and allows both lay and expert witnesses to testify
on the very questions at issue in the trial unless the testimony
is inadmissable under some other evidentiary rule. For exam57.
58.
59.

60.

61.
62.
63.

Id. 4 703 [03] ,at 703-18.
Ward v. Brown, 301 F.2d 445, 447 (10th Cir. 1962).
WEINSTEIN f 703 1031, at 703-18. See United States v. Williams. 424 F.2d 344
(5th Cir. 1970), petition for rehearing denied, 431 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1970), af'd.
enbanc, 447 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954, rehearing denied, 405 U.S. 1048 (1972).
E.g., Du Pont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co.. 6 F.Supp. 859, 885 (E.D.N.Y.
1934), modified, 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936); Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Elgin Clock Co., 26 F.2d 376 (D. Del. 1928). See Judge
Feinberg's analysis in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670,
682 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
FED. R. EVID. 703, Adv. Comm. Note.
703 [031,at 703-20.
WEINSTEIN
E.g., Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in America, 481 F.2d 445, 447 (5th Cir.
1973); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523

F.2d 1331, 1341 (2d Cir. 1975).
64.

"Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
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ple, under the old ultimate facts rule, a witness could give his
opinion as to the value of property before an alteration and
to its value afterward, but the witness would not be allowed
to express an opinion as to the amount of damage done since
the jury is to determine damages.r This traditional rule prohibits testimony on ultimate facts because the proper role of
a witness is to supply facts to the jury, and it is the function
of the jury to draw any inferences or conclusions necessary
to decide the case.6 Such a rationale has superficial appeal
since it obviates the "danger that the jury might forego independent analysis of the facts and bow too readily to the opinion of an expert or otherwise influential witness." 7
However, commentators have been uniformly outspoken
in their criticism of the ultimate facts rule. Wigmore called it
empty rhetoric and "one of those impracticable and misconceived utterances which lack any justification in principle".B
6
McCormick said it was "unfairly obstructive" and illogical. 9
Weinstein called it "the cause of many foolish reversals and
still more foolish appeals." 70 And Morgan termed it "sheer
nonsense."'" More specifically, the rationale for the rule was
often questioned. As more than one commentator has pointed out, there can be no invasion of the province of the jury,
for the jury has the power and the duty to judge the credibility of all witnesses, the weight to be given each opinion, and
to reject outright any opinion which is inadequately support72
ed.
Not only is the rationale for such a rule unsound, but its
development seems to have been a historical accident. As
Dean Ladd points out:
[I] t is questionable whether the earlier declarations
[against opinion evidence] meant more than that a
witness must have personally perceived what he is to
speak about. It is doubtful that the object of the rule
was to attempt to control the language through which
witnesses expressed facts.7
65. Yost v. Conroy, 92 Ind. 464, 47 Am. Rep. 156 (1883).
66. Runnion v. Kitts, 531 P.2d 1307 (Wyo. 1975).
67. MCCORMICK § 12, at 27.
68. 7 WIGMORE § 1921, at 19.
69. MCCORMICK § 12, at 28.
70. Morgan, Basic Problems of State and Federal Evidence, 195 (5th ed. WEINSTEIN
1976).
71. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 218 (1962).
72. 7 WIGMORE § 1920, at 18.
73. LaddExpert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 415 (1952).
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The ultimate facts rule has also been criticized as unworkable. Witnesses have complained that first they are sworn to
tell the truth and then the lawyers prevent them from doing
so. Instead of allowing the witness to fulfill his function of
aiding the jury, poorly. phrased questions or unwary witness
responses call forth a shower of objections that the question
calls for a conclusion or the answer would invade the province
of the jury. Learned Hand wrote:
No rule is subject to greater abuse; it is frequently an
obstacle to any intelligible account of what happens.
Most witnesses will tell their story in colloquial speech
which skips the foundations and runs in terms of the
'ultimate facts.' Ordinarily, they tell it much more
plainly in this way, and the warrant for what they say
can be perfectly probed by cross-examination .4
In other respects this rule proved unworkable. The courts,
from practical necessity, have long recognized exceptions in
such matters as size, speed, distance and value 75 although
opinions on these matters go to ultimate issues. In addition,
Efforts to meet the felt needs of particular situations
led to odd verbal circumlocutions which were said
not to violate the rule. Thus a witness could express
his estimate of the criminal responsibility of an accused in terms of sanity or insanity, but not in terms
of ability to tell right from wrong or other more modern standard. And in cases of medical causation, witnesses were sometimes required to couch their opinions
in cautious phrases of "might or could," rather than
"did," though the result was to deprive many opinions
of the positiveness to which they were entitled, accompanied by the hazard
of a ruling of insufficiency
76
to support a verdict.
Judicial efforts to resolve some of the confusion by distinguishing between testimony going to ultimate issues of
fact (allowed in some jurisdictions) 77 and testimony on ultimate issues of law (prohibited) were unsuccessful as "this required separating matters of law from matters of fact, an often impossible task....,,8
74. United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689, 693 (2d Cir. 1932).
75.

See, e.g., ColweU v. Anderson, 438 P.2d 448 (Wyo. 1968); Cederburg v. Carter, 448

76.
77.

P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1968).
FED. R. EvID. 704, Adv. Comm. Note.
See MCCORMICK § 12.

78.

WEINSTEIN

704 [01], at 5.
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Generally, it can be said that the ultimate facts rule is a
failure. 79 Faced with the choice of enforcing the rule and excluding useful information or changing the rule, more and
more jurisdictions are either modifying the rule8 0 or abolishing it completely. 81 Wyoming has followed the general trend.
Originally, Wyoming followed the traditional rule, 82 but in
recent years there were indications of change. 3 With the
adoption of Federal Rule 704, Wyoming has embraced the
better position and abolished the rule entirely. Weinstein
points out the advantages of the Federal Rule 704 which is
identical to Wyoming's:
The treatment of the ultimate rule problem in the
federal rules has numerous advantages over previous
practice. It eliminates quibbles over the meaning of
ultimate fact, and the distinction between fact and
law. Abolition of the rule ends the spectacle of courts
endorsing a principle which they cite only as a precursor to applying an exception. It stops the resort to
indirect means to bring the prohibited matter to the
jury's attention, and most importantly, it allows the
jury to receive the full benefit of a witness' judgment.
Both lay and expert witnesses may testify in a more
natural manner uninterrupted by technical objections
which interfere with the flow
of the trial but do not
84
further the cause of truth.
Rule 704 does not mean all opinions on ultimate facts
will be admitted. As with all opinion testimony under the
new Wyoming Rules, in order to be admissible the testimony
must be helpful to the trier of fact. 5 Questions that are
merely repetitious8 6 or so qualified as to make their value
negligible 87 may be disallowed as unhelpful. Weinstein notes
79.

80.
81.
82.

Judge Weinstein lists four reasons for the failure of the ultimate issue rule: 1) practical impossibility of distinguishing between ultimate and nonultimate fact, 2) difficulty of witness attempting to express self without reaching the ultimate issue, 3)
doubtful rationale of the rule, and 4) futile judicial effort to distinguish between
testimony on ultimate facts, which was allowed, and testimony on an issue of law,
which was prohibited. WEINSTEIN
704 [01], at 4-5.
See Stoebuck, Opinions on Ultimate Facts: Status, Trends, and a Note of Caution,
41 DEN. L.C.J. 226 (1964).
Arkansas, California, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Wisconsin and Wyoming have either adopted the Federal
Rule 704 or have a substantially similar rule.
Macy v. Billings, 74 Wyo. 404, 289 P.2d 422 (1955); State ex rel. Kirk v. Gail, 373

P.2d 955 (Wyo. 1962).
83.

Krahn v. Pierce, 485 P.2d 1021 (Wyo. 1971); In re Estate of Carey, 504 P.2d 793

(Wyo. 1972).
84. WEINSTEIN
704 [01], at 10.
85.
86.

See WRE 701-702.
United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.

1041 (1977).
87.

United States v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 416 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1976).
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that expert opinions which are expressed in terms of some
legal standard (i.e., whether plaintiff was disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act) would also be inadmissable.8 8 And, of course, if expert testimony is offered, the
court must first be satisfied the subject of the proffered testimony is a suitable one for an expert.8 9 Finally, judges have
considerable discretion under the new rules. First, they can
exclude testimony if its value is "substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 9 0 Second, under Rule 705, judges can insist that a
witness disclose the basis for his testimony.9 1
The adoption of Rule 704 and concomitant abolition of
the ultimate facts rule will go a long way toward eliminating
the confusions and inequalities inherent in the traditional approach. The new Rule 704 places a premium on helpfulness
rather than technical form and should allow necessary evidence to be given and received in a much more natural manner.
RULE 705: DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR DATA UNDERLYING
92
EXPERT OPINION

Prior to Rule 705, an expert witness was required to state
the factual basis for his testimony before actually giving his
opinion. Expert opinions could be based on either information observed personally by the expert (for example, data
collected by the physician-expert in the examination of a patient) or information inferred (for example, data a doctor obtains from reading medical records or listening to the testimony given at a trial). If an expert's opinion is not based on
personal observation, the generally accepted method of eliciting the factual data underlying an expert's opinion is the
hypothetical question. In the normal situation, a hypothetical question would recite all the relevant facts in evidence,
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

WEINSTEIN
704 [01], at 9.
Tabatchnick v. G. D. Searle, 67 F.R.D. 49 (D.N.J. 1975).
WRE 403.
WRE 705 discussed infra.
"The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
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and then the witness would be asked whether he is able to
form an opinion based on these assumed facts." The rationale
for such a procedure is to allow the jury to hear the basis of
the expert's opinion and to prevent opinion based on irrelevant or untrue statements.
While full disclosure of the expert's factual foundation is
praiseworthy, the use of hypothetical questions to elicit this
information has been severely attacked. Critics have termed
the use of such questions "a failure in practice and an obstruction to the administration of justice";M so "misused by
the clumsy and abused by the clever, [that it] has in practice
most
led to an intolerable obstruction of truth"; 95 and "the
'
justice."
of
face
fair
the
horrific and grotesque wen on
The principal objections to use of hypothetical questions
are that they allow an advocate to plead his case, tend to confuse and mislead the jury, and are often a waste of time. 97 Hypothetical questions allow a skillful advocate an excellent opportunity to plead his case under the guise of asking questions. The advocate can present a biased picture of the evidence by selecting some facts and omitting others, thereby
presenting "an unfair and inadequate picture to the expert,
and . . . the jury may give undue weight to the answer without considering its faulty basis." 98 The advocate can also use
the hypothetical to make a "final argument" in the middle of
the trial by including all the evidence favorable to his side. 99
Hypothetical questions have also been criticized as tending to mislead and confuse both the witnesses and the jury. 100
The Wisconsin Supreme Court said:
[M] dreover, the members of this court, based upon
their experience gleaned as practicing lawyers and
trial judges, are satisfied that a mechanistic hypothetical question has the effect of boring and confusing
the jury. Rather than inducing a clear expression of
expert opinion and the basis for it, it inhibits the ex93. 2 JONES § 14:24.
94. MCCORMICK § 16, at 36.
95. 2 WIGMORE § 686, at 812.
96. Judge Learned Hand, New York Bar Association Lectures on Legal Topics, 192122 (New York, 1926), quoted in MCCORMICK § 16, at 37 n.9.
97. Ladd, supra note 73, at 426-27.
98. MCCORMICK § 14, at 33.
99. FED. R. EvID. 705, Adv. Comm. Note.
100. 2 WIGMORE § 686, at 812.
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pert and forecloses him from explaining his reasoning
in a manner that is intelligible to a jury.10
It has been held to be error to allow questions which were so
long and complicated that they were likely to confuse wit02
nesses or baffle their memory.
Finally, the use of hypothetical questions has been severely condemned as wasteful of time and effort. 0 3 If the proponent does not include all of the facts material to the opinion
he wishes to solicit, he may run the risk of both a battle in
the courtroom over the adequacy of the question, and may
nevertheless be reversed on appeal. Caution has often forced
attorneys to set forth "so many elements in their attempt to
give a complete foundation, that the question becomes incomprehensible. In one extreme example, the hypothetical
question covered eighty-three pages of transcript and was followed by a fourteen page objection.104
Rule 705 eliminates mandatory preliminary disclosure of
the underlying facts and data, and therefore abolishes the
raison d 'etre for hypothetical questions. The use of hypothetical questions is not prohibited by Rule 705-the trial court
in its discretion can require preliminary disclosure of the factual basis for an expert's opinion and advocates can use hypothetical questions if they so desire-but the need for them
will be reduced. And under Rule 403 confusing, repetitious
or unnecessary questions can be excluded if the court finds
their probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangers of prejudice, confusion or waste of time.'0 5
Some attorneys fear expert testimony will be too brief.
Under the new rules:
One bar association suggested that an expert might
be called, qualified as an orthopedic surgeon, and
then examined:
Q: Doctor, do you have an opinion based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to the extent of permanent disability suffered by the plaintiff as a result of this auto accident?
101. Rabata v. Dohner, 45 Wis. 2d 111, 172 N.W.2d 409, 417 (1969).
102. Haish v. Payson, 107 Ill. 365; People v. Brown, 53 Mich. 531, 19 N.W. 172 (1884).
103. See MCCORMICK § 16, 2 WIGMORE § 686, at 812; FED. R. EVID. 705, Adv. Comm.
Note.
104. Treadwell v. Nickel, 194 Cal. 243, 228 P. 25 (1924).
105. WRE 403.
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A: Yes.
Q: What is your opinion?
A: She is totally and permanently disabled.
106
Q: Thank you doctor, that is all.
Weinstein commented tersely, "Congress found no objection
to such brevity. Many judges would welcome it." 107
In practice this procedure would be rarely followed since
the orderly presentation of evidence and the need to disclose
some information in order to qualify the expert as a witness
would necessitate some foundational questions.0 8 The real
advantage in proceeding under Rule 705 is that the witness
would be allowed to testify in a much more natural and orderly fashion. Time would be saved and reliability can still be
protected by full cross-examination. 109
To the objection of those who believe it is unfair to make
the cross-examiner bring out the underlying basis of his opponent's opinion, the Advisory Committee replies "the answer
is that he [the cross-examiner] is under no compulsion to
bring out any facts or data except those unfavorable to the
The note assumes fair and adequate discovery
opinion.""'
under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure."'
In spite of the reliance on, discovery, several problems remain. First, discovery is much more limited in criminal cases
and, therefore, does not afford an opposing counsel a fair opportunity to discover the probable basis for the expert's opinion before trial. Weinstein suggests that this problem can be
overcome. In criminal cases "the trial judge should exercise
his discretion more frequently to require a detailed preliminary disclosure of the premises on which the expert relied" 11
and he also suggests that counsel should exchange their experts' reports before trial to avoid surprise. 1" 3
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Hearings before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the
House Comm. of the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 355-56 (Supp. 1973), quoted
705 [01], at 2.
in WEINSTEIN
705 [01],at 2.
WENSTEIN
Id at 6-7.
Twin City Plaza, Inc. v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 409 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1969).
FED. R. EVID. 705, Adv. Comm. Note.
FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26 (b)(4) gives opposing parties the right to discover the names
of adverse experts, the subject matter and the probable content of the witness's
testimony.
705 [01] ,at 9.
WEINSTEIN
Id.
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Nevertheless, with the elimination of a requirement that
the basis for an expert's opinion be offered before the opinion itself, the chance of the jury hearing opinion that later
is found to be inadmissable is greatly increased. Of course,
the opposing counsel may object if the opinion is wholly
speculative and without any factual foundation and may
move the court to strike the testimony under Rules 403 and
611. But as one author has pointed out, "telling a jury to disregard something they have just heard is about as effective as
telling someone not to think of pink elephants." 4 Perhaps
the only complete solutions to this problem are either to ask
the judge to require preliminary disclosure of the basis for
the witness's testimony or to get permission to voir dire the
witness outside the hearing of the jury."'
In the ordinary case where full discovery is allowed, fears
that opponents will be at a disadvantage will prove groundless. If the proponent were merely to qualify his expert and
obtain a naked opinion on an ultimate issue, the opposing
counsel could decline to cross-examine, leave the opinion as
an unexplained conclusion, and then have his expert explain
in great detail the research upon which his contrary opinion
rests .116
Finally, it must be remembered that no opinion is conclusive, and as in the case of all other kinds of evidence, an
opponent is free to refute the proffered opinion by any other
admissable evidence. In any case, the jury is free to reject any
evidence it finds unreasonable.
In spite of the problems, Rule 705 is clearly better than
the traditional rule making preliminary disclosure in the form
of hypothetical questions required. It should aid court witnesses and the jury by saving time, avoiding confusion and
promoting fairness.
114.
115.

116.

McElhaney, Expert Witnesses and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 MERCER L.
REV. 463, 489 n. 97 (1977).
Two states which have recently adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence added a
subsection to Rule 705 specifically granting an opposing party the right to voir dire
the expert in order to avoid prejudicing the jury. See FLA. STAT. ANN., Evidence
Code § 90.705 (Supp. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Maine Rules of Evidence, Rule
705 (Supp. 1977).
Gibbons, Rules 701-706 Opinion and Expert Testimony, 57 CHI. B. REC. 224, 229

(1976).
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RULE 706: COURT APPOINTED EXPERTS'.
Rule 706 expressly permits the appointment of expert
witnesses by the court. Although there are no Wyoming cases
in this area, the inherent power of a court to appoint an expert of its own choosing is virtually unquestioned. 118 In this
respect Rule 706 merely affirms the common law and sets
forth the necessary procedure.
Subdivision (a) of Rule 706 provides the basic procedure
for appointing an expert. The proceeding can be initiated by
either party, or the court. The judge may request parties to
submit nominations and may appoint an expert agreed upon
by both parties, but he is not required to do so. After the expert has consented to serve, the judge must inform him of his
duties either in writing or at a conference in which all parties
may participate. The expert must communicate his findings
to the parties, and any party may depose the expert. At trial
any party, including the party calling the expert as a witness,
has the right to cross examine.
Subsection (b) provides for reasonable compensation for
court-appointed experts." 9 Subsection (c) gives the trial judge
discretion t6 authorize disclosure of the expert's status as a
court-appointed witness to the jury and Subsection (d) simply states that a party's right to call his own expert witnesses
is in no way restricted by the appointment of a witness by
the court.
117.

118.
119.

"(a) Appointment. The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and
may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert
witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own
selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the court unless he consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of his duties by the court in
writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which
the parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of his findings, if any; his deposition may be taken by any party;
and he may be called to testify by the court or any party. He shall be subject to
cross-examination by each party, including a party calling him as a witness.
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reasonable compensation in whatever sum the court may allow. The compensation thus fixed is
payable from funds which may be provided by law in criminal cases and civil actions. In civil actions and proceedings the compensation shall be paid by the parties
in such proportion and at such time as the court directs, and thereafter charged in
like manner as other costs.
(c) Disclosureof appointment. In the exercise of its discretion, the court may authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert witness.
(d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in this rule limits the parties in calling expert witnesses of their own selection.
Scott v. Spanjer Bros., Inc., 298 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1962); Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 390
(1964).
See note 1,supra.
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While no one questions the need for expert testimony in
litigation, commentators have been critical of the traditional
adversarial method of selecting experts which places the responsibility for finding and the costs of employing experts on
the parties to a lawsuit:
[The] biased nature of . .. permitting the parties to
employ their own expert witnesses . . . invite[s] the
suggestion of purchasing evidence and the suspicion
that he wins who can best pay the fees to the experts.120
Morgan notes that sometimes experts "have given shocking
exhibitions or partisanship in criminal cases, will contests and
personal injury litigation."'' In addition, juries can become
confused when confronted by experts from each side, each
expert swearing to a completely opposite conclusion. In such
a "battle of the experts" the expert fails to fulfill his function
to aid the trier of facts .122
To solve problems created by biased experts, many legal
scholars have approved the concept of the impartial expert, 12
and a number of plans had been adopted prior to Federal
Rule 706.124
Commentators have suggested that an impartial expert
appointed by the court would 'benefit the parties by reducing
the costs of litigation and would also benefit the state by reducing court congestion and trial costs."2 In addition, use of
impartial experts could reduce the "reluctance of many reputable experts to involve themselves in litigation."' 2 6 Substantial
justice would be served by reducing the tendency of parties
to "expert" shop and would also encourage the pretrial disposition of cases. Indeed, the Advisory Committee Note to
Federal Rule 706 points out the mere possibility of the use
of impartial experts would have a salutary effect on both the
127
expert witness and his employer.
120. 2 JONES § 14:25.
121.

MORGAN, STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 70, at 197.

122. MCCORMICK § 17.

123. See e.g., MCCORMICK § 17; 2 WIGMORE § 563; Sink, The Unused Power of a FederalJudge to Call His Own Expert Witnesses, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 195 (1956).
124. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 59-61 (1953); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 403-

10 (1942).

125.

Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence 116 (1963)

quoted in WEINSTEIN
126.
127.

706 [01], at 8.

FED. R. EvD. 706, Adv. Comm. Note.
FED. R. EVID. 706, Adv. Comm. Note.
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In spite of its many advantages, the use of court-appointed experts has been attacked for several reasons. One critic
has suggested the appointment of an expert by the court
would violate the constitutionally protected right to trial by
jury. 12 8 According to this argument, since the court-appointed expert is theoretically unbiased, his influence on the jury
would be unduly persuasive: "For all practical purposes, trial
by a single witness is substituted for trial by jury."' 1 9 However,
Rule 706 avoids the problem of undue influence by allowing
the court discretion in revealing the impartial status of the
expert. Use of the court's discretion in this matter should
adequately safeguard the integrity and fairness of the trial.
Critics of the court-appointed expert concept also point
out that experts may honestly and reasonably differ. For example, the propriety of using "open" versus "closed" reduction of a fracture in a specific situation is subject to medical
debate. To appoint the holder of an opinion on one school of
thought an "impartial expert" unnecessarily prejudices an expert for the opposing party. However, Rule 706 provides
safeguards: "a court expert's lack of neutrality can be readily
exposed because the parties must be furnished with his report
and have an absolute right to call their own experts, thus en3
abling them to prepare for cross-examination." 1
Finally, it should be noted that although Rule 706 codifies the trial court's common law power to call its own witnesses, there is little evidence to show that a trend is developing. Weinstein suggests that judges as a group "remain
committed to adversarial responsibility for presenting evidence." 3 1
CONCLUSION
Under the new rules witnesses are allowed to testify in a
more natural manner while reliability is safeguarded by requiring lay witnesses to testify from personal knowledge (Rule
701) and by requiring that experts be qualified by practical
experience or academic credentials (Rule 702).
128.
129.
130.
131.

Levy, ImpartialMedical Testimony-Revisited, 34 TEMP. L. Q. 416 (1961).
Id. at 124-25.
WEINSTEIN
706 [01], at 12.

Id.
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Other changes will streamline litigation by allowing an expert to base his opinion on inadmissable evidence if it is of
the type reasonably relied on by experts in his field (Rule
703), by allowing testimony on ultimate facts (Rule 704),
and by allowing an expert to give his opinion without prior
disclosure of the underlying facts (Rule 705). Finally, the
new rules expressly provide for the appointment of expeft
witnesses by the court (Rule 706). The preceding rules show
that the adoption of Article VII will promote fairness and
judicial efficiency by making helpfulness to the trier of fact
rather than technical form the standard under which opinion
testimony is admitted.
MARGARET E. PLUMB
MARY KAY LUNDWALL
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